This paper studies active learning in the context of robust statistics. Specifically, we propose a variant of the Best Arm Identification problem for contaminated bandits, where each arm pull has probability ε of generating a sample from an arbitrary contamination distribution instead of the true underlying distribution. The goal is to identify the best (or approximately best) true distribution with high probability, with a secondary goal of providing guarantees on the quality of this distribution. The primary challenge of the contaminated bandit setting is that the true distributions are only partially identifiable, even with infinite samples. To address this, we first develop tight, non-asymptotic sample complexity bounds for high-probability estimation of the first two robust moments (median and median absolute deviation) from contaminated samples, which may be of independent interest. Using these results, we adapt several classical Best Arm Identification algorithms to the contaminated bandit setting and derive sample complexity upper bounds for our problem. Finally, we provide matching information-theoretic lower bounds on the sample complexity (up to a small logarithmic factor). Our results suggest an inherent robustness of classical Best Arm Identification algorithms.
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Introduction
Consider Pat, an aspiring machine learning researcher deciding between working in a statistics, mathematics, or computer science department. Pat's sole criterion is salary, so Pat surveys current academics with the goal of finding the department with highest median income. However, some subset of the data will be inaccurate: some respondents obscure their salaries for privacy reasons, some convert currency incorrectly, and some do not read the question and report yearly instead of monthly salary, etc. How should Pat target his or her surveys, in an adaptive (online) fashion, to find the highest paying department with high probability in the presence of contaminated data?
In this paper, we study the Best Arm Identification (BAI) problem for multi-armed bandits where observed rewards are not completely trustworthy. The multi-armed bandit problem has received extensive study in the last three decades, see e.g. Robbins, 1985, Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi, 2012] . We study the fixed confidence, or (α, δ)-PAC, BAI problem, in which the learner must identify an α-suboptimal arm with probability at least 1− δ, using as few samples as possible. Most BAI algorithms for the fixed-confidence setting assume i.i.d. rewards from distributions with relatively strict control on the tails, such as boundedness or more generally sub-Gaussianity [Jamieson et al., 2014] . However, for Pat, the data neither are i.i.d. nor are from a distribution with controllable tails. How can we model this data, and how can we optimally explore these arms?
To answer the first question, we turn to robust statistics, which has studied such questions for over fifty years. In a seminal paper [Huber, 1964] , Huber introduced the contamination model, which we adapt to the multi-armed bandit model by proposing the Contaminated Best Arm Identification problem (CBAI). This is formally defined in Section 2, but is informally described as follows. There are k ≥ 2 arms, each endowed with a fixed base distribution F i and arbitrary contamination distributions G i,t for t ≥ 1. We place absolutely no assumptions on G i,t . When arm i is pulled in round t, the learner receives a sample that with probability 1 − ε is drawn from the arm's true distribution F i , and with the remaining probability ε is drawn from an arbitrary contamination distribution G i,t . The goal is to identify the arm whose true distribution has highest (or approximately highest) median. The median is the goal rather than the mean since the distributions are not assumed to have finite first moments; and even if they do, the true distributions' means are impossible to estimate from contaminated samples since the contaminations may be arbitrary. A key point is that suboptimality of the arms is based on the quality of the underlying true distributions F i , not the contaminated distributionsF i,t of the observed samples. Note that existing BAI algorithms, fed with samples fromF i,t , will not necessarily work.
This contamination model nicely fits Pat's problem: samples are usually trustworthy, but sometimes they are completely off and cannot be modeled by a distribution with controlled tails. Additionally, the nature of contamination changes with the respondent, and hence G i,t should be considered as time varying, which completely breaks the usual i.i.d. data assumption. Finally, Pat wants to determine the department with highest true median salary, not highest contaminated median salary.
The contaminated bandit setup also naturally models many other situations that the classical bandit setup cannot, such as any bandit problem where data may be subject to measurement or recording error with some probability. For example, consider the canonical problem of optimal experiment design where we are measuring drug responses, but in a setting where samples can be corrupted or where test results can be incorrectly measured or recorded. Another example is testing new software features, where yet-unfixed bugs may distort responses but will be fixed before release. More scenarios are discussed in Subsection 1.2 when comparing to other models in previous works, and in Subsection 2.1 after the formal definition of the CBAI problem.
Importantly, note that the CBAI problem is nontrivially harder than the BAI problem since there are no consistent estimators for statistics (e.g. the mean or median) of F i if the contaminations are allowed to be arbitrary. Under some mild technical assumptions on F i , the contamination can cause the median ofF i,t to be anywhere in an Θ(ε)-neighborhood of the median of F i , and hence we can only determine the median of F i up to some unavoidable estimation bias, U i , of order ε (see Section 2 for details). This leads us to later generalize our study to the more abstract Partially Identifiable Best Arm Identification (PIBAI) problem (defined formally in Section 3), which includes CBAI as a special case.
This PIBAI problem can be seen as an active-learning version of the classical problem of estimation under partial identifiability, which has been studied for most of the last century in the econometrics literature, see e.g. [Marschak and Andrews, 1944, Manski, 2009] . A canonical example in this field is trying to learn the age distribution of a population by only asking in which decade each subject was born; clearly the median age can only be learned up to certain unidentifiability regions.
Our Contributions
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to consider the Best Arm Identification problem with arbitrary contaminations. This contaminated bandit setup models many practical problems that the classical bandit setup cannot. However, developing algorithms for this setup requires overcoming the challenge of partial identifiability of the arms' true distributions. Indeed, it is not hard to show that the adversary's ability to inject arbitrary contaminations can render "similar" underlying distributions indistinguishable, even with access to infinite samples.
We analyze this CBAI problem under three models of the adversary's power: the oblivious adversary chooses all contamination distributions a priori; the prescient adversary may choose the contamination distributions as a function of all realizations (past and future) of the true rewards and knowledge of when the learner will observe contaminated samples; and the malicious adversary may, in addition, correlate when the learner observes contaminated samples with the true rewards. Subsection 2.1 gives formal definitions of these adversarial settings, as well as motivating examples and applications for each.
Our technical contributions can be divided into three parts:
(i) we prove tight, non-asymptotic sample complexity bounds for estimation of the first two robust moments (median and median absolute deviation) from contaminated samples,
(ii) we use the statistical results in (i) to develop efficient algorithms for the CBAI problem and provide sample complexity upper bounds for the fixed-confidence setting, and (iii) we prove matching information-theoretic lower bounds showing that our algorithms have optimal sample complexity (up to small logarithmic factors).
We elaborate on each of these below. Contribution (i). This may be of independent interest to the robust statistics community. We consider estimating statistics of a single arm from contaminated samples and show that although estimation of standard moments (mean, variance) is impossible, estimation of robust moments (median, median absolute deviation) is possible. Specifically, for each of the three adversarial models, we show that with probability at least 1 − δ, the empirical median of the contaminated samples lies in a region around the true median of width U i +E n,δ , where U i is some unavoidable bias that depends on quantiles of F i and the power of the adversary, n is the number of samples, and E n,δ is a confidence-interval term that decreases at the optimal log 1/δ n rate. Our results neatly capture the effect of the adversary's power by deriving different U i for each scenario, thereby precisely quantifying the hardness of the three different adversarial settings. We also present non-asymptotic sample complexity guarantees for estimation of the second robust moment, often called the Median Absolute Deviation (MAD), under all three adversarial settings. The MAD is a robust measure of the spread of F i and controls the width U i of the median's unidentifiability region.
Contribution (ii). We show that, surprisingly, several classical BAI algorithms are readily adaptable to the PIBAI problem. This suggests a certain inherent robustness of these classical bandit algorithms. We first present these algorithms for an abstract version of the PIBAI problem so that our algorithmic results may be easily transferrable to other application domains with different statistics of interest or different contamination models. We then combine these general results with our statistical results from (i) to obtain PAC algorithms for CBAI, the problem this paper focuses on. We give fixed-confidence sample complexity guarantees that mirror the sample complexity guarantees for BAI in the classical stochastic multi-armed bandit setup. The main difference is that BAI sample complexities depend on the suboptimality "gaps" ∆ i := p i * − p i between the statistics of the optimal arm i * and each suboptimal arm i, whereas our CBAI sample complexities depend on the suboptimality "effective gaps"
which account for the unavoidable estimation uncertainties in the most pessimistic way. We also show how to apply the MAD estimations results from (i) to obtain guarantees on the quality of the underlying distribution of the selected arm.
Contribution (iii). We prove matching information-theoretic lower bounds (up to a small logarithmic factor) on the sample complexity of CBAI via a reduction to classical lower bounds for the stochastic multi-armed bandit problem. We argue that for CBAI the effective gap∆ i is the right analog of the traditional gap since it appears in matching ways in both our upper and lower bounds.
Previous Work
The Best Arm Identification problem in the fixed-confidence setting has a long history, see e.g. [Bechhofer et al., 1968, Lai and Robbins, 1985] . Recent interest in the learning theory community was sparked by the seminal paper by [Even-Dar et al., 2002] , which proposed several algorithms obtaining instance-adaptive sample complexity bounds. Since then, there has been significant work on the algorithmic side [see Kalyanakrishnan et al., 2012 , Gabillon et al., 2012 , Karnin et al., 2013 , Jamieson et al., 2013 . Concurrently, a parallel line of work has focused on improving lower bounds, starting with the 2-armed setting [Chernoff, 1972, Anthony and Bartlett, 2009] , extending to the multiarmed setting [Mannor and Tsitsiklis, 2004] , and, more recently, continuing with more finely tuned lower bounds that include properties of the arm distributions aside from the gaps [Chen and Li, 2015 , Kaufmann et al., 2016 , Garivier and Kaufmann, 2016 .
In the cumulative regret setting, the online learning literature has considered both stochastic bandits with mild tail assumptions (for example [Bubeck et al., 2013] only assumed the existence of a (1 + ε) moment) and algorithms that obtain near-optimal regret guarantees if the environment is stochastic or adversarial [Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi, 2012] . The partial monitoring problem is also loosely similar to the CBAI problem in the sense that both problems feature partial identification; there, the learner only knows the loss up to some subset [Bartók et al., 2014] . We note, however, that minimizing cumulative regret is not a reasonable goal in our contamination setup since the contaminations can be arbitrary and even unbounded (see also below for examples where even with boundedness -but within a large range -this is not a good criteria).
The existing literature closest to our work studies the BAI problem in settings more general than i.i.d. arms, for example stochastic but non-stationary distributions or arbitrary rewards where each arm converges to a limit [Jamieson and Talwalkar, 2016, Li et al., 2016] . However, neither setting fits the contamination model or allows for arbitrary perturbations.
A related contamination model is studied in [Seldin and Slivkins, 2014] ; however, they make a boundedness assumption which makes their setup drastically different from ours. 1 Specifically, they consider cumulative regret minimization in a setting where rewards are bounded in [0, 1] and contaminations can be arbitrary. Because of this [0, 1] boundedness, contamination can move the means by at most ε, which is why it is reasonable that they base their algorithms on the contaminated means. However, the best contaminated mean is not a reasonable proxy for the best mean without the [0, 1] boundedness assumption. First off, the contaminated distributions may not even have finite first moments. Moreover, when rewards are bounded but only within a large range, the contaminated mean can deviate from the true mean by ε times the size of that range. This can lead to an error bound that is extremely loose -sometimes to the point of being useless for prediction or estimation -compared to the tight bound given by quantiles (see Lemma 1) which our algorithms achieve (see Subsection 4.2).
For instance, consider the adaptive survey example mentioned earlier. There might be a wide range of (true) academic salaries, say between zero and a million dollars. As such, contaminating an ε fraction of the data could move the mean by roughly 10 6 · ε; even for a reasonable value of ε = 0.1, this error bound of roughly 10 5 is so large that it may drown out the actual information that the survey was trying to investigate. On the other hand, the median may be moved a significantly smaller amount since the (true) distribution of academic salaries might have reasonably narrow quantiles around the median (e.g. if it is somewhat bell-shaped). This performance improvement is intuitively explained by the fact that most academic salaries are not at the extremes of 0 or a million dollars, but rather are fairly regular around the median. An identical phenomenon occurs, for example, in the canonical problem of optimal experiment design where we are measuring drug responses but samples can be corrupted or where test results can be incorrectly measured or recorded. Indeed, if the measurements of interests are, say, blood pressure or weight, the values might only be bounded within a large range, but the true distribution might have reasonably narrow quantiles around the median. This paper also makes connections between several long bodies of work. The contamination model [Huber, 1964] has a long history of more than fifty years in robust statistics, see e.g. [Hampel, 1974 , Maronna and Yohai, 1976 , Rousseeuw and Leroy, 2005 , Hampel et al., 2011 . Contamination models and malicious errors have also been studied in the computer science community; see, for example, the classical papers of [Valiant, 1985, Kearns and Li, 1993] and a recent burst of results on algorithms that handle estimation of means and variances [Lai et al., 2016] , efficient estimation in high dimensions [Diakonikolas et al., 2018] , PCA [Cherapanamjeri et al., 2017] , and general learning [Charikar et al., 2017] in the presence of outliers or corrupted data. Finally, the partial identification literature from econometrics also has a rich history [Marschak and Andrews, 1944 , Horowitz and Manski, 1995 , Manski, 2009 , Romano and Shaikh, 2010 , Bontemps et al., 2012 .
Notation
We denote the Dirac measure at a point x ∈ R by δ x , the Bernoulli distribution with parameter p ∈ [0, 1] by Ber(p), and the uniform distribution over an interval [a, b] by Unif ([a, b] ). The interval [a − b, a + b] is denoted by [a±b] , the set of non-negative real numbers by R ≥0 , the set of positive integers by N, and the set {1, . . . , n} by [n] for n ∈ N. We abbreviate "with high probability" by "w.h.p." and "cumulative distribution function" by "cdf".
Let F be a distribution. We denote its left and right quantiles, respectively, by Q L,F (p) := inf{x ∈ R : F (x) ≥ p} and Q R,F (p) := inf{x ∈ R : F (x) > p}. We denote the set of medians of F by m 1 (F 
. When F has a unique median, we overload m 1 (F ) to be this point rather than a singleton set containing it. For shorthand, we often write m 1 (X) for a random variable X to denote m 1 (F ), where F is the law of X. When F has a unique median, we denote the median absolute deviation
, and m 4 (F ) are robust analogues of centered first (mean), second (variance), and fourth (kurtosis) moments, respectively.
The empirical median of a (possibly random) sequence x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ R is denoted bŷ m 1 (x 1 , . . . , x n ): if n is odd, this is the middle value; and if n is even, it is the average of the middle two values. The empirical MADm 2 (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is then defined asm 1 (x 1 − m 1 (x 1 , . . . , x n ), . . . , x n −m 1 (x 1 , . . . , x n )).
Outline
Section 2 formally defines the CBAI problem and the power of the adversary, describes several motivating applications and examples, and discusses the primary challenge of the problem: partial identifiability. Section 3 presents our algorithmic results for the abstract setting of best arm identification under partial identifiability (the PIBAI problem). We state these algorithms in this general setting so that they may be easily transferrable later to other application domains with different statistics of interest or different contamination models. Section 4 then specializes to the CBAI problem. In order to implement the aforementioned general-purpose PIBAI algorithms for CBAI, concentration results are needed for estimation of medians given contaminated samples. These statistical results are developed in Subsection 4.1. Subsection 4.2 then uses these to conclude our CBAI algorithms and give upper bounds on their sample complexities. Subsection 4.3 then gives matching information-theoretic sample-complexity lower bounds showing that our algorithms are optimal (up to small logarithmic factors). This answers the primary question the paper sets out to solve: understanding the complexity of identifying the arm with best median given contaminated samples. Section 5 then turns to our secondary goal: providing guarantees on the distribution of the selected arm. This requires additionally estimating the second robust moment. Subsection 5.1 develops the necessary statistical results, which Subsection 5.2 then uses to provide our algorithmic results. Section 6 concludes and gives several open problems.
Formal Setup
Here we formally define the Contaminated Best Arm Identification problem (CBAI). Let k ≥ 2 be the number of arms, ε ∈ (0, 1 2 ) be the contamination level, {F i } i∈ [k] be the true but unknown distributions, and {G i,t } i∈[k],t∈N be arbitrary contamination distributions. This induces contaminated distributionsF i,t , samples from which have laws (1
Note that if all of these random variables are independent, then eachF i,t is simply equal to the contaminated mixture model (1 − ε)F i + εG i,t . However, we generalize by also considering the setting when the Y i,t , D i,t , Z i,t are not all independent. This allows an adversary to further obfuscate samples by adapting the distributions of the D i,t and Z i,t based on the realizations of the Y i,t (that is, by coupling these random variables); see below for details.
At each iteration t, a CBAI algorithm chooses an arm I t ∈ [k] to pull and receives a sample X It,t distributed according to the corresponding contaminated distributionF It,t . After T iterations (a possibly random stopping time that the algorithm may choose), the algorithm outputs an armÎ ∈ [k]. For α ≥ 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), the algorithm is said to be (α, δ)-PAC if with probability at least 1 − δ,Î has median within α + U of the optimal:
where U is the unavoidable uncertainty term in median estimation that is induced by partial identifiability (see Subsection 2.2 for a discussion of U , and see Subsection 4.1 for an explicit computation of this quantity). Thus, the goal is to find an algorithm achieving the PAC guarantee in (1) with small sample complexity T , either in expectation or with high probability.
Power of the Adversary
As is typical in online learning problems, it is important to define the power of the adversary since this affects the complexity of the resulting problem. Interestingly, CBAI is still possible even when we grant the adversary significant power. We consider three settings, presented in increasing order of adversarial power. The key differences between these different types of adversaries are twofold: (1) whether they can choose the contaminated distributions "presciently" based on all other realizations {Y i,t , D i,t } i∈[k],t≥1 both past and future; and (2) whether they can "maliciously" couple the distributions of each D i,t with the corresponding Y i,t , subject only to the constraint that the marginals D i,t ∼ Ber(ε) and Y i,t ∼ F i stay correct.
• Oblivious adversary.
, and Y i,t and D i,t are independent.
• Prescient adversary. Same as the oblivious adversary except that the contaminations Z i,t may depend on everything else (i.e.
• Malicious adversary. Same as the prescient adversary except that Y i,t and D i,t do not need to be independent. 3 We note that for all three of these adversarial settings, we do not require independence between the outputs (Y i,t , D i,t , Z i,t ) of the arms. The oblivious adversary is well-motivated, as many real-world problems where contaminations may occur fit naturally into this model. Indeed, this encompasses any bandit problem where data may be subject to measurement or recording error with some probability. For instance, this includes measuring drug responses, testing new software features with yet-unfixed bugs, conducting surveys, etc. as mentioned in the introduction. The theory we develop extends naturally and with little modification for the prescient and malicious adversaries. Moreover, these different settings allow for the modeling of many other real-world scenarios in which the contamination models are not as simple. For instance, all data may already exist but not yet be released to the learning algorithm. If adversaries have access to all the data from the beginning, they may be able to contaminate samples depending on all the data -this is captured by the prescient setting. The malicious setting includes, for example, scenarios in which adversaries (e.g. hackers) can successfully contaminate a given sample depending on the amount of effort they put into it, and the adversaries can try harder to contaminate certain samples depending on their values.
Perhaps surprisingly, we will show that the sample complexity is the same for both oblivious and prescient adversaries. Indeed for these two settings, we will prove our upper bounds for the more powerful setting of prescient adversaries, and our lower bounds for the less powerful setting of oblivious adversaries. We also note that the rate for malicious adversaries is only worse by at most a "factor of 2"; see Section 4 for a precise statement.
Challenge of Partial Identifiability of the Median
In the introduction, we emphasized the point that a contaminating adversary can render different underlying distributions of an arm statistically indistinguishable. That is, even with infinite samples, it is impossible to estimate statistics of an arm's true distribution exactly. Consider, for example, the problem of estimating the median of a single arm with true distribution F against an oblivious adversary, which is the weakest of our three adversarial settings. Define S to be the set of all distributions F ′ for which there exists adversarially chosen distributions G and
How large is this set S, and in particular, how far can the medians of distributions in S be from the median of F ?
The following simple example shows that S is non-trivial (and thus in particular contains more than just F ). Let F be the uniform distribution on the interval [−1, 1], and let G be the uniform distribution on
We conclude that F is statistically indistinguishable from any of the translations {F (· − p)} p∈ [−c,c] . Hence, S is non-trivial and contains distributions with medians at least Ω(c) away from m 1 (F ). Even in this simple setting, infinite samples only allow us to identify the median of F at most up to the unidentifiability region [−c, c] .
In fact, this toy example captures the correct dependence on ε of how far the median of the contaminated distribution can be shifted, as formalized by the following simple lemma.
Lemma 1. For any ε ∈ (0, 1 2 ), any distribution F , and any median m ∈ m 1 (F ),
Proof. The fact that the left hand side is no smaller than the right hand side is straightforward: to shift the median to the right (resp. left), let {G n } n∈N be a sequence of distributions which are Dirac measures at n (resp. −n). We now prove the reverse direction, the "≤" inequality for any fixed distribution G. For shorthand, denote the contaminated distribution byF := (1 − ε)F + εG, and denote its left and right medians bym
We boundm L presently, as boundingm R follows by a similar argument or by simply applying them L bound to
Finally, we note that for some simple contamination models, partial identifiability in CBAI is not a problem for identifying the arm with the best median. For example, if all arms are contaminated with a common distribution, then although the true medians are only partially identifiable, the contaminated medians are ordered in the same way as the true medians, albeit perhaps not strictly. However, for general (arbitrary) contaminations, such an ordering invariance is clearly not guaranteed.
Algorithms for Best Arm Identification Under Partial Identifiability
Our algorithms for CBAI actually work for the more general problem of best arm identification in partially identified settings. Specifically, consider any setting where the statistic (for example, the median or mean) which measures the goodness of an arm can be estimated only up to some unavoidable error term due to lack of identifiability. The main result of this section is informally that certain BAI algorithms for the classical stochastic multi-armed bandit setting can be adapted with little modification to such partially identified settings. Perhaps surprisingly, this suggests a certain innate robustness of many existing classical BAI algorithms.
Because of this generality, we present our algorithms in this section for this slightly more abstract problem of Partially Identifiable Best-Arm-Identification problem (PIBAI), which we define formally below. This abstraction allows our algorithmic results to later be transferred easily to other variants of the Best Arm Identification problem with different contamination models or different statistics of interest. We will show in Section 4 how to adapt this to the CBAI problem, the main focus of the paper, after first developing the necessary statistical results.
We now formally define the setup of PIBAI. Let k ≥ 2 be the number of arms. For each arm i ∈ [k], consider a family of distributions D i = {D i (p i , G)} G∈G where p i is a parameter of interest associated with each arm and G is a nuisance parameter in some abstract space G. We let i * := arg max i∈[k] p i be the best arm. We assume the existence of non-negative unavoidable biases {U i } i∈[k] satisfying (i) even from infinitely many independent samples X t , t = 1, 2, . . .
for some unknown, possibly varying G t ∈ G (t ≥ 1), it is impossible to estimate p i more precisely than the region [p i ± U i ], and
(ii) there exists some estimator that, for any α > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), uses n α,δ =
Sample arm i for n α/2,δ/k times, and generate estimatep i end OutputÎ := max i∈[k]pi .
Algorithm 1: Simple uniform-exploration algorithm for PIBAI.
The PIBAI problem is then precisely the standard fixed-confidence stochastic bandit game using these distributions where in each iteration t, the algorithm chooses an arm I t ∈ [k], and receives a sample from
By the partial identifiability property (i), it is clear that even given infinite samples, it is impossible to distinguish between the optimal arm i * and any suboptimal arm i = i * satisfying p i + U i ≥ p i * − U i * . Therefore, we assume henceforth the statistically possible setting in which the effective gaps∆ i := (
For any α ≥ 0, arm i is said to be α-suboptimal if∆ i ≥ α. Moreover, for any α ≥ 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), a PIBAI algorithm is said to be (α, δ)-PAC if it outputs an armÎ that is α-suboptimal with probability at least 1 − δ. That is,
where the above probability is taken over the possible randomness of the samples, the estimator from (ii), and the PIBAI algorithm.
We now present algorithms for the PIBAI problem. First, in Subsection 3.1, we present a simple algorithm that performs uniform exploration among all arms. Next, in Subsection 3.2, we obtain more refined, instance-adaptive sample complexity bounds by adapting the Successive Elimination algorithm of [Even-Dar et al., 2006] . All algorithms use as a blackbox an estimator satisfying the above property (ii) of the PIBAI problem.
Simple algorithm
A simple (α, δ)-PAC PIBAI algorithm is the following: pull each of the k arms n α/2,δ/k times to create estimatesp i and output the armÎ := max i∈[k]pi with the highest estimate. Pseudocode is given in Algorithm 1.
4 Using the same techniques as presented in this paper, one can also consider PIBAI for general n α,δ = O(α −2 log 1 δ ) and compute the resulting sample complexities. However, for simplicity of presentation, we assume that n α,δ = O(α −2 log 1 δ ) since anyways this is the natural (and optimal) quantity for many estimation problems such as estimating a median from contaminated samples (see Corollaries 12 and 13), or using Chernoff bounds to estimate the mean of a [0, 1]-supported distribution for classical stochastic MAB, etc.
Sample each arm i ∈ S once and producep i,r from all r past samples of it S ← {i ∈ S :p i,r ≥ max j∈Spj,r − 2α r,6δ/(π 2 kr 2 ) } r ← r + 1 end Output the only arm left in S Algorithm 2: Adaptation of Successive Elimination algorithm for PIBAI. Here, α r,δ := c log 1 δ r , where c is a universal constant satisfying n α,δ ≤ cα −2 log 1 δ (see (2)).
Theorem 2. For any α > 0 and δ
Proof. By (2) and a union bound, we have that with probability at least 1−δ, all estimateŝ
implying thatÎ is α-suboptimal. The sample complexity bound is clear.
Instance-adaptive algorithms
The sample complexity of the simple Algorithm 1 is not adaptive to the difficulty of the actual instance: an arm is sampled n α/2,δ/k times even if it is far from α-suboptimal (meaning that∆ i ≫ α) and could potentially be eliminated much more quickly. In this subsection, we obtain such an instance-adaptive sample complexity by modifying the Successive Elimination algorithm of [Even-Dar et al., 2006] , which was originally designed for the classical multi-armed bandit problem. Pseudocode is given in Algorithm 2. At each round r, Algorithm 2 gets a single new sample from each remaining arm in order to update its estimatep i,r . Then, for the next round r + 1, it only keeps the arms i whose estimatesp i,r are α-close to the best estimate, where the threshold α is updated at each round. The algorithm and analysis are almost identical to the original. As such, proof details are deferred to Appendix C. The main difference is that in the proof of correctness, we show the event {|p i,r − p i | ≤ U i + α r,6δ/(π 2 kr 2 ) , ∀r ∈ [R], ∀i ∈ S r } occurs with probability at least 1 − δ. This ensures that in each round r, each estimatep i,r is accurate enough to use for the elimination step.
Note that Algorithm 2 returns the optimal arm w.h.p. (without knowing the smallest effective gap), unlike Algorithm 1 above which only returns a near-optimal arm w.h.p.
Theorem 3. Let δ ∈ (0, 1). With probability at least 1 − δ, Algorithm 2 outputs the optimal arm after using at most O
Moreover, as noted in Remark 9 of [Even-Dar et al., 2006] , Algorithm 2 is easily modified (simply terminate early) to be an (α, δ)-PAC algorithm with sample complexity
where N α is the number of α-suboptimal arms with∆ i ≤ α.
Remark 4. In the multi-armed bandit literature, the sample complexity of the Successive Elimination algorithm (tight up to a logarithmic factor) was improved upon by [Karnin et al., 2013] 's Exponential-Gap Elimination (EGE) algorithm (tight up to a doubly logarithmic factor). A natural idea is to analogously improve upon the PIBAI guarantee in Theorem 3 by adapting the EGE algorithm. However, this does not work. The same holds for adapting the Median Elimination algorithm of [Even-Dar et al., 2006] and the PRISM algorithm of [Jamieson et al., 2013] . The reason for the inadaptability of these algorithms -in contrast to the easy adaptability of the Successive Elimination algorithm above -is due to the following "additive property of suboptimality" for BAI:
"If arm i has ∆ i suboptimality gap w.r.t. the optimal arm i * , and if arm j has ∆ (i) j suboptimality gap w.r.t. arm i, then arm j has suboptimality gap
The critical point is that the same argument does not work for PIBAI since errors propagate from adding the uncertainties U i in the suboptimality gaps: that is,
Because of this, in order to return an α-suboptimal arm for PIBAI, we must ensure that all arms that are more than α-suboptimal are eliminated before the optimal arm is eliminated (if it ever is). This is in contrast to BAI in the classical multi-armed bandit setup: there, it is not problematic if the best (or even currently best) arm is eliminated at round r, so long as the best arm in consecutive rounds r and r + 1 changes at most by a small amount. 5 We stress that this nuance is not merely a technicality but actually fundamental to the correctness proofs for PIBAI.
Finding the Best Median
The previous section provided algorithms for the general PIBAI problem; here in this section, these algorithms are adapted to the special case of the CBAI problem, which is the focus of the paper. This requires an estimator of the median from contaminated samples that concentrates at an exponential rate 6 . Subsection 4.1 develops these statistical results, which are of potential independent interest to the robust statistics community. Subsection 4.2 then combines these results with the results of the previous section to conclude 5 In particular, at most 2 −r α for most of these aforementioned algorithms, since this implies that the final armÎ is at most ∞ r=1 2 −r α = α-suboptimal. 6 For the formal statement, see (ii) in the definition of PIBAI in Section 3. algorithms for CBAI, and gives upper bounds on their sample complexity. Finally, Subsection 4.3 gives information-theoretic lower bounds showing that the sample complexities of these algorithms are optimal (up to a small logarithmic factor).
Estimation of Median from Contaminated Samples
In this subsection, we develop the statistical results needed to obtain algorithms for the CBAI problem. Specifically, we obtain tight, non-asymptotic sample-complexity bounds for median estimation from contaminated samples. We do this for all three adversarial models for the contamination (oblivious, prescient, and malicious). These results may be of independent interest to the robust statistics community.
The subsection is organized as follows. First, Subsection 4.1.1 studies the concentration of the empirical median under the most general distributional assumptions and provides, for all three adversarial settings, tight upper and lower bounds on the sample complexity of median estimation from contaminated samples. Next, in Subsection 4.1.2 we obtain more algorithmically useful guarantees by specializing these results to a family of distributions where the cdfs increase at least linearly in a neighborhood of the median, a very common assumption in the robust estimation literature. For this family of distributions, we explicitly compute for all three adversarial settings the unavoidable bias terms mentioned in Section 2 for median estimation from contaminated samples. It is worth emphasizing that these results precisely quantify the effect of the three different adversarial strengths on the complexity of the problem of median estimation in the contamination model.
Throughout this subsection, we will only consider a single arm, and its true distribution will be denoted by F . For brevity of the main text, all proofs are deferred to Appendix B.1.
General Concentration Results for Median Estimation
Lemma 1 implies that some control of the quantiles of F is necessary to obtain guarantees for estimation of m 1 (F ) from contaminated samples. We begin by considering F in the following family of distributions, which we stress is the minimum possible requirement needed for median estimation. Definition 1. For anyt ∈ (0, 1 2 ) and any non-decreasing function R : [0,t] → R ≥0 , define Ht ,R to be the family of all distributions F satisfying
for any t ∈ [0,t] and any median m ∈ m 1 (F ).
Note that if ε >ε(t) := 2t 1+2t , it is impossible to control the deviation of the contaminated median from the true median for F ∈ Ht ,R . Indeed, the requirement ε ≤ε(t) := 2t 1+2t is equivalent tot ≥ ε 2(1−ε) , which, by Lemma 1, is the largest possible deviation from the 1 2 -quantile.
Combining Lemma 1 and Definition 1 produces a tight bound on how far the contaminated median can be moved from the true median for any F ∈ Ht ,R .
Corollary 5. For anyt ∈ (0, 1 2 ), any ε ∈ (0,ε(t)), and any non-decreasing function
We now turn to estimation results. At this point it is necessary to distinguish between the three adversarial settings for the contamination. We begin with guarantees for oblivious and prescient adversaries. It turns out that the rates are the same for both settings. In particular, we show that with probability at least 1 − δ, the estimation error is bounded above by R( ε 2(1−ε) + O( log 1/δ n )). Note that if R is Lipschitz, then this quantity is bounded above by the unavoidable uncertainty term R( ε 2(1−ε) ) (see Corollary 5) plus an error term that decays quickly with n −1/2 rate and sub-Gaussian tails. We remark that this latter confidence-interval term is of optimal order, since it is tight even for estimating the mean (and thus median) of a Gaussian random variable with known unit variance from uncontaminated samples.
Lemma 6. Lett ∈ (0, 1 2 ), ε ∈ (0,ε(t)), and F ∈ Ht ,R . Let Y i ∼ F and D i ∼ Ber(ε), for i ∈ [n], all be drawn independently. Let {Z i } i∈[n] be arbitrary random variables possibly depending on {Y i , D i } i∈ [n] , and define
Note that the minimum sample complexity n must grow as ε 2(1−ε) approachest; this is because the class Ht ,R only assumes control on the [ 1 2 ±t] quantiles. We now turn to malicious adversaries and derive analogous tight, non-asymptotic sample complexity bounds for median estimation from contaminated samples. We show that it possible to obtain estimation accuracy of R(ε) in this malicious adversarial setting (Lemma 7). Note that this is weaker than the the accuracy of R( ε 2(1−ε) ) obtained above against oblivious and prescient adversaries. However, we also show that this dependency is tight and unavoidable (Lemma 8). Moreover, the O( log 1/δ n ) error term in Lemma 7 is tight for the same reason as it was in Lemma 6; see the discussion there. Finally, we remark that the upper bound on ε and the lower bound on the sample complexity n in Lemma 7 are exactly the analogues of the corresponding bounds in Lemma 6; the only difference is that malicious adversaries can force the contaminated distributions to have medians at roughly F −1 ( 1 2 ±ε), resulting in our need for control of these further quantiles.
Lemma 7. Lett ∈ (0, 1 2 ), ε ∈ (0,t), and F ∈ Ht ,R . Let (Y i , D i ), for i ∈ [n], be drawn independently with marginals Y i ∼ F and D i ∼ Ber(ε). Let {Z i } i∈[n] be arbitrary random variables possibly depending on {Y i , D i } i∈ [n] , and define
any confidence level δ ∈ (0, 1) and sample complexity n ≥ 2 (t − ε) −2 log 3 δ , P sup
Lemma 8. Lett ∈ (0, 1 2 ), ε ∈ (0,t), δ ∈ (0, 1), n ≥ 1 2 ε −2 log 1 δ , and R : [0,t] → R ≥0 be any strictly increasing function. Then there exists a distribution F ∈ Ht ,R and a joint distribution on (D, Y, Z) with marginals D ∼ Ber(ε) and Y ∼ F , such that F has unique median and
is drawn independently from the joint distribution, and
Improved Concentration under Quantile Control
In order to obtain more algorithmically useful rates for median estimation from contaminated samples, we now introduce a more specific class of cdfs F that increase at least linearly in a neighborhood around the median. This ensures that F is not "too flat" in this neighborhood, which we stress is a very standard assumption for median estimation.
Definition 2. Fort ∈ (0, 1 2 ) and B > 0, let Ft ,B be the family of distributions F that have a unique median and satisfy
We make a few remarks about the definition. i) Requiring the right-hand side of (4) to scale inversely in the median absolute deviation (MAD) m 2 (F ) ensures closure of Ft ,B under scaling; see below. We also mention that m 2 (F ) is a robust measure of the spread of F (it is the "median moment" analogue of variance), and controls the width of the median's unidentifiability region. ii) If F ∈ Ft ,B , then F ∈ Ht ,R for R(t) := Bm 2 (F )t. iii) Note that distributions in Ft ,B are not required to have densities, nor even be continuous. iv) The family Ft ,B has many natural and expected properties, such as closure under scaling and translation. These properties are gathered and proved in Lemma 23, which is deferred to Appendix A for brevity of the main text. , where φ is the standard Gaussian density and q α is the corresponding α-quantile; ii) the uniform distribution on any interval, for anȳ t ∈ (0, 1 2 ) and any B ≥ 4; and iii) any distribution F with positive density F ′ , for anȳ
We now apply the estimation results for Ht ,R to estimation for Ft ,B . By Lemma 23, whenever F ∈ Ft ,B , then F ∈ Ht ,R for R(t) := tBm 2 (F ). Corollary 5 immediately yields a bound on the size of the contamination region in terms of the quantity U ε,B,m 2 := Bm 2 ε 2(1 − ε) .
Corollary 10. For anyt ∈ (0, 1 2 ), any ε ∈ (0,ε(t)), and any F ∈ Ft ,B , sup
Remark 11 (Tightness of Corollary 10). For any a > 0, let F be the uniform distribution over [0, a] . Then m 1 (F ) = a 2 and m 2 (F ) = a 4 , and thus F ∈ Ft ,B for anyt ∈ (0, 1 2 ) and B = 4. Now for any ε ∈ (0,ε(t)) ⊂ (0, Now we turn to median estimation bounds. Since R(t) = tBm 2 (F ) is clearly Lipschitz, the discussion preceding Lemmas 6 and 7 about the optimality of the following error bounds applies. That is, the error decomposes into the sum of the unavoidable uncertainty term U ε,B,m 2 (F ) plus a confidence-interval term decaying at the rate of n −1/2 with subGaussian tails, both of which are optimal. For brevity, we omit the proofs of the following corollaries since they follow immediately from Lemmas 6, 7, and 23.
Corollary 12. Consider the same setup as in Lemma 6, except with the added restriction that F ∈ Ft ,B . Then, for any confidence level δ ∈ (0, 1), error level E > 0, and sample complexity n ≥ 2 max
Corollary 13. Consider the same setup as in Lemma 7, except with the added restriction that F ∈ Ft ,B . Then for any confidence level δ ∈ (0, 1), error level E > 0, and sample complexity n ≥ 2 max
In Corollary 13 above, we have defined
which is a tight bound on the uncertainty in median estimation that a malicious adversary can induce (see Lemma 8).
Algorithms
In this subsection, we apply the algorithms developed in Section 3 for the general problem of PIBAI to the special case of CBAI. In order to implement the estimator in part (ii) of the definition of PIBAI (see Section 3), we make use of the guarantees proved in the previous Subsection 4.1 for median estimation from contaminated samples. Nearly matching information-theoretic lower bounds are provided in the following subsection and show that the algorithms below have optimal sample complexity (up to a small logarithmic factor). We will only assume that the arms' distributions are in Ft ,B and have robust second moments uniformly bounded 7 by somem 2 ; this will allow us to perform median estimation from contaminated samples. For simplicity, the parameters of this family are assumed to be known to the algorithm beforehand 8 . Note, however, that it is not necessary to know ε, but only an upper bound ε 0 on ε; indeed ε can be replaced with ε 0 in all our algorithms. It is very standard in the robust statistics literature to assume knowledge of such an upper bound ε 0 on the amount of contamination. The parametert can then be arbitrarily chosen by the algorithms, so long as it is bigger than ε 0 /(2(1 − ε 0 )) (or ε 0 in the malicious case) and smaller than 1/2.
The sample complexities we prove below are in terms of the effective gaps∆ i := (m 1 (F i * )−U i * )−(m 1 (F i )+U i ) of the suboptimal arms i = i * , where i * := arg max i∈[k] m 1 (F i ) is the arm with the highest median. Here U i is the unavoidable uncertainty term for median estimation from contaminated samples under the given adversarial setting. Recall from Subsection 4.1 we computed these U i explicitly: U i = U ε,B,m 2 (F i ) for oblivious and prescient adversaries by Corollary 12 and U i = U (malicious) ε,B,m 2 (F i ) for malicious adversaries by Corollary 13. We emphasize that this means the strength of the adversarial setting is encapsulated in the corresponding U i .
First, we discuss how the simple Algorithm 1 yields an (α, δ)-PAC algorithm for CBAI without modification. Note that in this settingp i is the empirical median of the payoffs of arm i. The quantity n α,δ is equal to 2 max( B 2m2 2 α 2 , (t − ε 2(1−ε) ) −2 ) log 2 δ against oblivious and prescient adversaries by Corollary 12, and is equal to 2 max(
−2 ) log 3 δ against malicious adversaries by Corollary 13. Theorem 2 along with the observation that the constant term in the sample complexity n α,δ only introduces a term that is negligible in the overall sample complexity of Algorithm 1, immediately yields the following result.
7 It is typically necessary to have bounds on higher order moments in order to control the error of estimating lower order moments, see e.g. [Bubeck et al., 2013] . 8 The classes of distributions that we define have two parameters that would be hard or even impossible to estimate in practice, namely B andm2. In classical setups in which algorithms need to learn means instead of medians, it is common to assume that there is a second moment σ 2 which is known, or at least bounded by a known constant. This is because in practice σ 2 is hard to estimate from the data. Note that if the distributions Fi are known to have bounded support,m2 can be chosen as the size of the domain. It seems that knowing B is the price to pay to go from the classical to the robust setup. Indeed, even in the non-contaminated case, it is well known that the median of a distribution can be estimated at a parametric rate only when the distribution is not too flat around its median. In that case, the estimation rate depends on how "non-flat" the distribution is, i.e., in the present setup, on Bm2(F ). In a parametric setup, i.e., when the distributions of the arms Fi, i = 1, . . . , K are known up to some location and/or scale parameters, B would be known, since it is translation and scale invariant (see Lemma 23).
Sample each arm i ∈ S for 1 + ⌈2N log( r+1 r )⌉ times, and producep i,r from all past samples S ← {i ∈ S :p i,r ≥ max j∈Spj,r − 2α r,6δ/(π 2 kr 2 ) } r ← r + 1 end Output the only arm left in S Algorithm 3: Adaptation of successive elimination algorithm (see Algorithm 2) for CBAI. For oblivious and prescient adversaries, N := 2(t − ε 2(1−ε) ) −2 ; and for malicious adversaries N := 2(t − ε) −2 . In all settings, α r,δ := Next, we discuss how to apply Algorithm 2. In the traditional Successive Elimination Algorithm for BAI, concentration inequalities are needed even for small sample sizes, since during the first round each arm is pulled only once. However, our guarantees from Section 2 are only valid when the sample size is greater than a certain threshold. Hence, we need to modify Algorithm 2 to obtain additional samples in an initial exploration phase. Moreover, in each round of Algorithm 3, we get more than one sample per remaining arm in order to produce updated estimates, as opposed to Algorithm 2 where we require only one new sample of each arm per round. Pseudocode is given in Algorithm 3. Theorem 15. Let F i ∈ Ft ,B with m 2 (F ) ≤m 2 for each arm i ∈ [k], and let the adversary be either oblivious, prescient, or malicious. Let δ ∈ (0, 1). With probability at least 1 − δ, Algorithm 3 outputs the optimal arm after using at mostÕ
The proof follows from Theorem 3 and is deferred to Appendix C. Note that, identically as noted for Algorithm 2, Algorithm 3 can be stopped earlier in order to obtain an (α, δ)-PAC guarantee.
Lower Bounds
Here we provide information-theoretic lower bounds on the sample complexity of the CBAI problem that match, up to small logarithmic factors, the algorithmic upper bounds proved above in Subsection 4.2 for each of the three adversarial settings. The main insight is that we can reduce hard instances of the BAI problem to hard instances of the CBAI problem. In this way, we can leverage the sophisticated lower bounds already developed in the classical multi-armed bandit literature.
Let i * := arg max i∈[k] m 1 (F i ) denote the optimal arm. As in Subsection 3 above, ∆ i := (m 1 (F i * ) − U i * ) − (m 1 (F i ) + U i ) denotes the effective gap for suboptimal arms i = i * , and U i denotes the unavoidable uncertainty term for median estimation. We emphasize that since the power of the adversary is encapsulated in the U i and therefore also the effective gaps, we can address all three adversarial settings simultaneously by proving a lower bound in terms of the corresponding effective gaps.
In Section 3, we argued that the PIBAI problem is impossible when there exists suboptimal arms with non-positive effective gaps; the CBAI problem clearly also has this property. Indeed, if i = i * satisfies∆ i ≤ 0, then there exist distributions G i * and G i such that the resulting contaminated distributionsF i := (1 − ε)F i + εG i andF i * := (1 − ε)F i * + εG i * have equal medians. Moreover, since the distributions F are arbitrary (CBAI makes no parameteric assumption), it is impossible to determine whether arm i or i * has a higher true median. Thus, any CBAI algorithm, even with infinite samples, cannot succeed with probability more than 1 2 . Therefore, we only consider the setting where all effective gaps∆ i are strictly positive. The results in this section lower bound the sample complexity of any CBAI algorithm in terms of the effective gaps. We will focus on lower bounds for the function class Ft ,B and provide lower bounds matching the upper bounds for CBAI in Section 4.2.
Theorem 16. Consider CBAI against an oblivious, prescient, or malicious adversary. There exists a positive constant B such that for any number of arms k ≥ 2, any confidence level δ ∈ (0, 
where i * = arg max i∈[k] m 1 (F i ) is the optimal arm.
Taking the limit as α → 0 in Theorem 16 immediately yields the following lower bound on (0, δ)-PAC algorithms.
Corollary 17. Consider the same setup as in Theorem 16. There exists a CBAI instance F 1 , . . . , F k ∈ Ft ,B for which any (0, δ)-PAC algorithm uses at least the following number of samples in expectation:
Proof Sketches. We now sketch the proofs of Theorem 16 and Corollary 17. Full details are deferred to Appendix D for brevity of the main text.
The key idea in the proof is to "lift" hard BAI instances to hard CBAI problem instances. Specifically, let {P i } i∈ [k] be distributions for arms in a BAI problem, let {U i } i∈ [k] be the corresponding unavoidable uncertainties for median estimation of P i in CBAI , and let i * denote the best arm. We say {P i } i∈ [k] admits an "(ε, Ft ,B )CBAI-lifting" to {F i } i∈ [k] if (i) F i ∈ Ft ,B for each i, (ii) there exists some adversarial distributions {G i } i∈ [k] such that each P i = (1 − ε)F i + εG i ; and (iii) the effective gaps∆ i for the {F i } i∈ [k] are equal to the gaps ∆ i in the original BAI problem. Intuitively, such a lifting can be thought of as choosing F i * to have the smallest possible median and the other F i to have the largest possible median, while still being consistent with P i and remaining in the uncertainty region corresponding to the U i .
Armed with this informal definition, we now outline the central idea behind the reduction. Let {P i } i∈[k] be a "hard" BAI instance with best arm i * , and assume it admits an (ε, Ft ,B )-CBAI-lifting to {F i } i∈ [k] . Consider running a CBAI algorithm A on the samples obtained from {P i }; we claim that if A is (α, δ)-PAC, then it must output an α-suboptimal arm for the original BAI problem. Indeed, by (ii), the samples from the BAI instance have the same law as the samples that would be obtained from the CBAI problem with {F i }, and by (iii), the effective gaps in the CBAI problem are equal to the gaps in the original problem. Therefore, A must have sample complexity for this problem that is no smaller than the sample complexity of the best BAI algorithm.
Let us make a few remarks about this proof. First, note that the {F i } in the lifting need only exist, as we do not explicitly use these distributions but instead simply run A on samples from the original bandit instance. Thus ensuring the existence of such a lifting is the main obstacle.
This raises a technical yet important nuance: most BAI lower bounds are constructed from Bernoulli or Gaussian distributions which are not quite compatible with the reduction described above. The problem with Bernoulli arms is that they do not have liftings to Ft ,B : any resulting F i would not satisfy (4) and thus cannot be in Ft ,B . Gaussian arms run into a different problem: it is not clear how to shift Gaussian arms up or down far enough to change the median by exactly the maximum uncertainty amount U i . We overcome this nuance by considering arms with smoothed Bernoulli distribution SBer(p), which we define to be the uniform mixture between a Bernoulli distribution with parameter p and a uniform distribution over [0, 1] . Indeed, this distribution is (ε, Ft ,B )-CBAI-liftable: unlike the Bernoulli distribution, it is smooth enough to have liftings in Ft ,B ; and unlike the Gaussian distribution, the median of the appropriate lifting of SBer(p) is exactly U i away from the median of SBer(p). Both of these facts are simple calculations; see Appendix D for details.
The only ingredient remaining in the proof is to prove that there are hard instances for BAI with SBer-distributed arms. This follows easily from Lemma 1 and Remark 5 in Kaufmann et al. [2016] .
Quality Guarantees for the Selected Arm
In the previous Section 4, we developed algorithms for CBAI and proved that they select the best (or an approximately best) arm with high probability. However, in many applications, it is desirable to also provide guarantees on the quality of the selected arm of the form: "with probability at least 80%, a new random variable Y ∼ FÎ is at least 10," say.
Such a quality guarantee could be accomplished directly using the machinery developed earlier in Subsection 4.1 by, for example, estimating the 0.2 quantile in addition to the median (the 0.5 quantile). However, this approach has two problems. First, if we would like to obtain such a guarantee for multiple probability levels (such as 55%, 60%, . . . , etc.) we would have to perform a separate estimation for each of the corresponding quantiles. Second, and more importantly, estimation of a quantile q from contaminated samples requires control of quantiles in a ε 2(1−ε) neighborhood of q (this follows by an identical argument as in Lemma 1), which can severely restrict the range of quantiles that are possible to estimate.
We circument both of these problems here by estimating the median absolute deviation (MAD) in addition to the median. The MAD describes the scale of the tails of a distribution away from the median, and is the appropriate analogue to variance (which may not exist for F and, we stress, is anyways not estimable from contaminated samples) for this contamination model setting.
This section is organized as follows. Subsection 5.1 first develops these statistical results for estimation of the MAD from contaminated samples. Subsection 5.2 then uses these results to prove that the CBAI algorithms presented earlier in Subsection 4.2 -with no additional modifications -can also provide quality guarantees for the selected arm. That is, we show that in addition to outputting the best (or an approximately best) arm, these algorithms also provide quality guarantees to a certain precision "for free" without needing extra samples.
Estimation of Second Robust Moment from Contaminated Samples
In this subsection, we develop the statistical results needed to obtain quality guarantees for the selected arm in the CBAI problem. Specifically, we consider only a single arm and obtain non-asymptotic sample-complexity bounds for estimation of the second robust moment (the MAD) from contaminated samples. We do this for all three adversarial models for the contamination (oblivious, prescient, and malicious). These results may be of independent interest to the robust statistics community.
The subsection is organized as follows. First, Subsection 5.1.1 introduces a class of distributions for which the MAD is estimable from contaminated samples. The few assumptions we make are common in the statistics literature, and we give multiple examples showing that many common distributions are included in this class. Subsection 5.1.2 then proves finite-sample guarantees for MAD estimation from contaminated samples, for this class of distributions. This is done for all three adversarial settings for the contamination.
A Class of Distributions with Estimable Second Robust Moment
Like the median, the MAD is not fully identifiable from contaminated samples (see discussion in Section 2.2). However, we can estimate the MAD up to a reasonable region of uncertainty with only a few additional assumptions.
Definition 3. For anyt ∈ (0, 1 2 ), B > 0,m 2 > 0, and κ ≥ 0, let Ft ,B,m 2 ,κ be the family of distributions F with unique robust moments m 1 (F ), m 2 (F ), and m 4 (F ) satisfying:
Let us make a few remarks on this definition. i) We emphasize that our CBAI algorithms already have optimality guarantees when the arm distributions are in Ft ,B (see Section 4.2); the additional assumption that the arm distributions are in Ft ,B,m 2 ,κ allows us to also obtain quantile guarantees on the arm returned by the algorithm (see Section 5.2). ii) Property (iii) of the definition requires bounds on the higher robust moments, namely the fourth median moment. Informally, higher robust moments are necessary to control the error of estimation of lower robust moments, analogous to how bounds on variance (resp. kurtosis) are typically necessary for estimation of a distribution's mean (resp. variance). iii) Note that distributions in Ft ,B,m 2 ,κ are not required to have densities, nor even be continuous. iv) The family Ft ,B,m 2 ,κ satisfies some natural and expected properties, such as closure under translation. These properties are gathered and proved in Lemma 23, which is deferred to Appendix A for brevity of the main text.
Remark 18 (Examples). Many common distributions (e.g. the normal distribution, the uniform distribution, the Cauchy distribution, etc.) belong to Ft ,B,m 2 ,κ for some values of the parameterst, B,m 2 , and κ. For instance, the uniform distribution on the interval [a, b] is in Ft ,B,m 2 ,κ for anyt ∈ (0, 1 2 ), any B ≥ 4, any κ ≥ 2, and anym 2 ≥ b−a 4 . Another example is that the Cauchy distribution with scale parameter a belongs to Ft ,B,m 2 ,κ for anȳ t ∈ (0, 1 2 ), any B ≥ π(1 + max(1, tan(πt) 2 )), and κ ≥ √ 3 − 1, and anym 2 ≥ a. We recall that a Cauchy distribution with scale parameter a > 0 has density 1 πa 1 1 +
x−x 0 a 2 , x ∈ R, where x 0 ∈ R is a location parameter. For such a distribution, it is easy to check that m 1 (F ) = x 0 , m 2 (F ) = a and m 4 (F ) = a( √ 3 − 1). Note that neither the mean nor the variance exists for the Cauchy distribution.
Concentration Results for Estimation of Second Robust Moment
We are now ready to present finite-sample guarantees on the speed of convergence of the empirical MADm 2 to the underlying distribution's MAD m 2 when given contaminated samples. For brevity of the main text, all proofs are deferred to Appendix B.2.
We first present results for the oblivious and prescient adversarial settings. As before, the estimation error decomposes into the sum of two terms: a bias term reflecting the uncertainty the adversary can inject given her contamination level, and a confidenceinterval term that shrinks with an optimal n −1/2 rate and sub-Gaussian tails.
Lemma 19. Lett ∈ (0, 1 2 ), ε ∈ (0, min(ε(t), 1 B )), and F ∈ Ft ,B,m 2 ,κ . Let Y i ∼ F and D i ∼ Ber(ε), for i ∈ [n], all be drawn independently. Let {Z i } i∈[n] be arbitrary random variables possibly depending on {Y i , D i } i∈ [n] , and define
Then, for any confidence level δ > 0, error level E > 0, and sample complexity n ≥ 2 max
Similar to median estimation above, it is possible to estimate the MAD even in the malicious adversarial setting.
, be drawn independently with marginals Y i ∼ F and D i ∼ Ber(ε). Let {Z i } i∈[n] be arbitrary random variables possibly depending on {Y i , D i } i∈ [n] , and define
Algorithmic Guarantees
We now apply these statistical results for MAD estimation to show that the CBAI algorithms presented earlier in Subsection 4.2 -with no additional modifications -can also provide quality guarantees for the arm they select. That is, we show that in addition to outputting the best (or an approximately best) arm, these algorithms also provide quality guarantees to a certain precision "for free" without needing extra samples. For simplicity and brevity, we describe this below just for the simple Algorithm 1. A nearly identical (yet technically hairier) argument yields a similar guarantee for our adaptation of the Successive Elimination algorithm for CBAI (Algorithm 3).
We will make the assumption that the arms distributions are in Ft ,B,m 2 ,κ so that the MAD estimation results proved above will apply. For simplicity, the parameters of this family are assumed to be known to the algorithm beforehand.
The following simple lemma will be helpful to prove the desired types of guarantees. In words, it shows that the lower tail of any distribution F ∈ Ft ,B,m 2 ,κ is controlled by its median and MAD.
Lemma 21. Let F ∈ Ft ,B,m 2 ,κ and Y ∼ F . Then simultaneously for all t ∈ [0,t],
Proof. By item (6) of Lemma 23, we have that for all t ∈ [0,t], t =
F )t and completes the proof.
With this lemma in hand, we turn to guarantees for the arm returned by Algorithm 1. The following guarantees hold for all adversarial settings since the adversarial strength is encapsulated in the definition of the unavoidable uncertainty terms U i .
Theorem 22. Let F 1 , . . . , F k ∈ Ft ,B,m 2 ,κ . Let ε ∈ (0, min( if the adversary is malicious. Consider using Algorithm 1 for CBAI exactly as in Theorem 2. LetÎ denote the arm it outputs, let Y be a random variable whose conditional distribution onÎ is FÎ , and letm 1 andm 2 denote the empirical median and MAD, respectively, from the samples it has seen from FÎ . Then, simultaneously for all t ∈ [0,t],
Proof. By definition of Algorithm 1,Î is sampled n α/2,δ/k = 2 max(
times against oblivious and prescient adversaries, and n α/2,δ/k = 2 max
−2 log 3k δ times against malicious adversaries. Therefore -by Corollary 12 and Lemma 19 for oblivious and prescient adversaries, or similarly by Corollary 13 and Lemma 20 for malicious adversaries -we have by a union bound that with probability at least 1 − 3δ k , both of the following inequalities hold:
Whenever this event occurs, we have that Note that the bound inside the probability term in Theorem 22 can be far less conservative than the crude boundm 1 − tBm 2 if ε and α are small.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed the Best Arm Identification problem for contaminated bandits (CBAI). This setup can model many practical applications that cannot be modeled by the classical bandit setup. On the way to efficient algorithms for CBAI, we developed tight, non-asymptotic sample-complexity bounds for estimation of the first two robust moments (median and median absolute deviation) from contaminated samples. These results may be of independent interest, perhaps as ingredients for adapting other online learning techniques to similar contaminated settings.
We formalized the contaminated bandit setup as a special case of the more general partially identifiable bandit problem (PIBAI), and presented ways to adapt celebrated Best Arm Identification algorithms for the classical bandit setting to this PIBAI problem. The sample complexity is essentially changed only by replacing the suboptimality "gaps" with suboptimality "effective gaps" to adjust for the challenge of partial identifiability.
We then showed how these algorithms apply to the special case of CBAI by making use of the aforementioned guarantees for estimating the median from contaminated samples. We complemented these results by proving nearly matching information-theoretic lower bounds on the sample complexity of CBAI, showing that (up to a small logarithmic factor) our algorithms are optimal. This answered the question this paper set out to solve: determining the complexity of finding the arm with highest median given contaminated samples. Finally, we used our statistical results on estimation of the second robust moment from contaminated samples, to show that "for free" without additional samples, our algorithms can also output quality guarantees on the selected arm.
Our paper suggests several potential directions for future work, including the following.
• Our upper and lower bounds on the sample complexity of CBAI are off by a logarithmic factor in the number of arms. It is an interesting open question to close this gap, especially since many of the tricks for doing this in the classical BAI setup do not seem to extend to this partially identifiable setting (see Remark 4). One concrete possibility is to obtain a tighter upper bound by adapting the algorithm of [Jamieson et al., 2014] to the CBAI problem. This would require proving a nonasymptotic version of the Law of the Iterated Logarithm for empirical medians, which would be of independent interest.
• We have developed algorithms for online learning in the presence of partial identifiability. How far does this toolkit extend? In particular, do our results apply to more complicated or more general feedback structures such as partial monitoring (see e.g. [Bartók et al., 2014] ) or graph feedback (see e.g. [Alon et al., 2017] )?
• The contaminated bandit setup models many real-world problems that cannot be modeled by the classical bandit setup. Is it applicable and approachable to formulate other classical online-learning problems in similar contamination setups?
• More abstractly, we think that problems at the intersection of online learning and robust statistics are not only mathematically rich, but also are increasingly relevant for modern applications given the recent influx of active learning tasks with data that is not completely trustworthy. It may be valuable to use techniques from one of the fields to approach problems in the other, as we did here.
A Properties of Ft ,B and Ft ,B,m 2 ,κ
The following lemma lists some simple properties of Ft ,B (defined in Definition 2) and Ft ,B,m 2 ,κ (defined in Definition 3), which we use often throughout the paper. For shorthand, below we denote I F,t := Q L,F ( 1 2 −t), Q R,F ( 1 2 +t) for a distribution F and a real numbert ∈ (0, 1 2 ).
Lemma 23. If F ∈ Ft ,B , then:
1. The distribution F (a · +b) is also in F B,t for any a = 0.
F is monotonically increasing in
4. Q L,F (F (x)) = x for all x ∈ I F,t and we write F −1 for Q L,F = Q R,F .
5. The left and right quantiles of F are equal in the interval F (I F,t ) = [
Moreover if also F ∈ Ft ,B,m 2 ,κ , then:
7. The distribution F (a · +b) is in F B,t,am 2 ,κ for any a = 0.
8. Let H be the distribution of |Y − m|, where Y ∼ F . Then H ∈ Ft H ,B H , where
Proof. When proved in order, all of these statements follow easily from the definition of the function class and the earlier statements. The only part requiring effort is item 8, which we prove presently. Fix any r 1 , r 2 ∈ I H,t H , where without loss of generality r 1 ≥ r 2 ≥ 0. Then
The only step requiring justification is the inequality in (5): this is evident by (4) if r 1 , r 2 ∈ [m 1 (F )±2m 2 (F )], but this condition must be checked. Once we show this condition is met, however, we are immediately done. Therefore, it is now sufficient to prove r 1 , r 2 ∈ [m 1 (F )±2m 2 (F )]. Since r 1 , r 2 ≥ 0, it suffices to show that the largest value in I H,t H , namely Q R,H ( 1 2 +t H ), is at most 2m 2 (F ). And to show this, it suffices to show 1 2 +t H < H(2m 2 (F )). We show this last inequality presently: by an similar argument as in the first few lines of the above display,
≥t H ,
by property (i) in the definition of Ft ,B,m 2 ,κ , and (7) is due to (4). This completes the proof.
B Proofs for Estimation from Contaminated Samples B.1 Estimation of Median
Oblivious and prescient adversaries: proof of Lemma 6.
Proof of Lemma 6. For shorthand, letm :=m 1 (X 1 , . . . , X n ) and let m ∈ m 1 (F ) be any median of F . For each i ∈ [n], define the indicator random variable
Moreover, the {L i } i∈ [n] are independent, and thus by Hoeffding's inequality,
Therefore, with probability at least 1
where the final inequality is due to (3), which we may invoke since Malicious adversaries: proofs of Lemma 7 and 8. Below, it will be convenient to denote by y (k) the k-th order statistic of a (possibly random) sequence y 1 , . . . , y n ∈ R.
Informally, the proof of Lemma 7 proceeds by (i) showing thatm 1 (X 1 , . . . , X n ) is deterministically bounded within the order statistics Y (⌊ n 2 ⌋± n i=1 D i ) (Lemma 24), (ii) applying Hoeffding's inequality to argue that w.h.p., at most n i=1 D i ≈ εn samples are contaminated, and (iii) reusing the techniques of Lemma 6 to argue that w.h.p., the order statistics of Y (⌊ n 2 ⌋±εn) are within the desired error range from m 1 (F ). Since each of these steps is tight up to a small amount of slack, the proof of the converse Lemma 8 proceeds essentially by just showing that each of these steps occurs also in the opposite direction w.h.p.
The following lemma will be helpful for step (i). Its proof is straightforward by induction on s and is thus omitted.
, where y 1 ≤ · · · ≤ y n and z 1 , . . . , z n are arbitrary real-valued sequences, and d 1 , . . . , d n is an arbitrary binary-valued sequence satisfying s :
Proof of Lemma 7. Define for shorthand a := log(3/δ) 2n . By Hoeffding's inequality, the event E := { n i=1 D i ≤ (ε + a)n} occurs with probability at least P(E) ≥ 1 − δ 3 . Since ε + a ≤t < 1 2 by our choice of n, Lemma 24 implies that, whenever E occurs,
An identical argument (or simply by symmetry on F (−·)) also yields that Y (⌊ n 2 ⌋−⌊(ε+a)n⌋) < Q L,F ( 1 2 − ε − 2a) with probability at most δ 3 . We conclude by a union bound that with probability at least 1 − δ,
Whenever this occurs, we have by virtue of (3) that sup m∈m 1 (F ) |m 1 (X 1 , . . . , X n ) − m| ≤ R (ε + 2a), since both 1 2
±t] by our choice of n.
Proof of Lemma 8. Consider any distribution F with unique median 0 satisfying R(t) = Q R,F ( 1 2 + t) = −Q L,F ( 1 2 − t) for each t ∈t. Such an F can be constructed by starting with a Dirac measure δ 0 at zero and then pushing mass to the tails as far as (3) . The marginal of D is easily seen to be correct, since
Let a := log(1/δ) 2n , and note that a < ε by our choice of n. For each i ∈ [n], define the indicator r.v.
Each of these has mean
Therefore, by Hoeffding's inequality, we conclude that
B.2 Estimation of Second Robust Moment
Here we prove Lemma 19. Informally, this will be done by decomposing the MAD estimation error into two terms, each of which resembles the error between a true median (of a distribution related to F ) and an empirical median of contaminated samples, and then applying the median estimation guarantees from the previous section. Before proving Lemma 19, however, we first present several lemmas which will be helpful in the proof.
Lemma 25. For any (possibly random) sequence x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ R and any c ∈ R, the following inequality holds (almost surely, over the possible randomness of the sequence)
Proof. For any fixed vector x ∈ R n , the function c →m 1 (|x 1 +c|, . . . , |x n +c|) is 1-Lipschitz since it is the composition of 1-L ∞ Lipschitz functions: adding c 1, taking entrywise absolute values, and taking an order statistic.
We also give the following distributional version of Lemma 25.
Lemma 26. Consider any real-valued random variable X and any c ∈ R. Assume that m 1 (|X|) and m 1 (|X + c|) are unique. Then
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that c ≥ 0; the case c < 0 follows by an identical argument or by symmetry. For shorthand, let m := m 1 (|X|) and letm := m 1 (|X + c|). First, we show thatm ≤ m + c, i.e., we show that P(|X + c| ≤ m + c) ≥ 1 2 . This is straightforward:
, where we the first step is by non-negativity of m and the last step is by definition of m. A nearly identical argument shows m ≤m + c, namely P(|X| ≤m + c) = P(−m − c ≤ X ≤m + c) = P(−m ≤ X ≤m + 2c) ≥ P(−m ≤ X ≤m) = P(|X| ≤m) ≥ 1 2 . We therefore conclude that |m − m| ≤ c.
Lemma 27. For any distribution F with unique m 2 (F ) and m 4 (F ),
We are now ready to prove Lemma 19.
Proof of Lemma 19. For shorthand, denotem :=m 1 (X 1 , . . . , X n ), and let H denote the distribution of |Y − m 1 (F )| where Y ∼ F . By the fact m 2 (F ) = m 1 (H), Lemma 25, and the triangle inequality, the MAD estimation error is bounded above by:
By Corollary 12 and our choice of n, the second error term in (8) is bounded above by U ε,B,m 2 (F ) + E 2 with probability at least 1− δ 2 . To control the first error term in (8), we apply Corollary 12 with the distribution H in lieu of F and the contaminationsZ i := |Z i −m 1 (F )| in lieu of Z i . Thus, by combining item 8 in Lemma 23 with Corollary 12, this first error term is bounded above by U ε,κB,m 2 (H) + E 2 with probability at least 1− δ 2 whenever we have at least 2 max 4B 2 κ 2 m 2 2 (H)E −2 , (min(
δ samples, which is satisfied because of our choice of n and the inequality m 2 (H) = m 4 (F ) ≤ 2m 2 (F ) from Lemma 27. Therefore, a union bound implies that, with probability at least 1−δ, the MAD estimation error is at most U ε,B,m 2 (F ) + U ε,κB,m 2 (H) + E. By another application of the inequality m 2 (H) ≤ 2m 2 (F ), this is bounded above by (1 + 2κ)U ε,B,m 2 (F ) + E, as desired.
The proof of Lemma 20 -the analogous result to Lemma 19 but for the malicious adversarial setting -is omitted since it is identical to the proof of Lemma 19 with the uses of Corollary 12 replaced by uses of Corollary 13.
C Proofs for Adaptation of the Successive Elimination Algorithm
We first define some notation. Let c be a constant such that n α,δ ≤ c α 2 log 1 δ for all α > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1); such a constant clearly exists by definition of PIBAI; see (2). Let R denote the number of total rounds in Algorithm 2 before termination; and for each round r ∈ [R], let S r denote the set of all arms still in S when entering round r. For succintness, we also denote δ r := 6δ π 2 kr 2 . Proof of Theorem 3. Without loss of generality, assume that the best arm is i * = 1. Consider the event E := {|p i,r − p i | ≤ U i + α r,δr , ∀r ≥ 1, ∀i ∈ S r }. The following inequality is a consequence of a union bound, where we consider virtual estimatesp i,r for r ≤ R, i / ∈ S r or r > R, i ∈ [k] that could be obtained if we continued to pull the eliminated arms indefinitely:
where above we have used (2) and the famous Basel identity.
We conclude from the above that E occurs with probability at least 1 − δ. Henceforth let us be in the event that E occurs. A simple induction argument shows that 1 ∈ S r for each round r ∈ [R], yielding that Algorithm 2 outputs the optimal arm. Indeed, at each round r for which 1 ∈ S r , E guarantees that for all j ∈ S r , p 1,r ≥ p 1 − U 1 − α r,δr =∆ j + p j + U j − α r,δr > p j + U j − α r,δr ≥p j,r − 2α r,δr , and so by definition of Algorithm 2, the optimal arm 1 is not eliminated at round r. Now, still assuming that E occurs, let us bound the sample complexity T . For each i ∈ [k], denote by T i the number of times that arm i is pulled. Then clearly T = k i=1 T i . Moreover, since arm 1 is never eliminated (proved above), T ≤ 2 k i=2 T i . For each i ≥ 2, arm i is eliminated no later than the first round r in whichp i,r <p 1,r − 2α r,δr which, by E, is satisfied as soon as p i + U i + α r,δr < p 1 − U 1 − 3α r,δr , i.e.,∆ i > 4α r,δr . We conclude that arm i is eliminated in the first round r wherẽ ∆ i > 4α r,δr = 4 c log(
Now this is granted when
for some universal constant C > 0. Hence,
Proof of Theorem 15. The proof is nearly identical to that of Theorem 3. The main difference in the proof of correctness is just that at each round r ≥ 0, if any arm is still in S r , it has been pulled at least the following number of times:
, N log 3 δ r , and thus we may apply the median estimation guarantee in Corollary 12 or Corollary 13, depending on whether the adversarial setting is oblivious or prescient (the former) or malicious (the latter). Specifically, this enables the identical guarantee as used in the proof of Theorem 3 for estimating the median up to accuracy α r,δr with probability at least 1 − δ r . Hence, the (0, δ)-PAC guarantee follows easily by the identical reasoning. The only difference in the sample complexity proof is that it is affected by the additional draws
where T i is the number of times that arms i is pulled. By what was shown in Theorem 3, the first term
)), and the second term
D Proofs for Lower Bounds
In this section, we make the proof sketch in Subsection 4.3 formal. The proof is broken into two parts. First, we exhibit hard instances for BAI in which the arms all have smoothed Bernoulli distributions. Second, we reduce this instance into a lower bound instance for CBAI. Throughout, we adopt the standard assumption in the multi-armed bandit literature (see e.g. [Mannor and Tsitsiklis, 2004] ) that all algorithms we consider have a stopping time T which is almost surely finite.
D.1 BAI Lower Bound
We follow closely the classical change-of-measure argument for proving gap-dependent lower bounds for the BAI problem. [Mannor and Tsitsiklis, 2004] gave the first such proof by exhibiting hard instances for BAI using Bernoulli-distributed arms. However, our CBAI reduction will not work with Bernoulli distributions (see proof sketch in Subsection 4.3), and so here we exhibit hard instances for BAI using instead a distribution that will work for our CBAI reduction, namely the smoothed Bernoulli distribution.
Recall that we define the smoothed Bernoulli distribution with parameter p ∈ (0, 1), denoted by SBer(p), to be the uniform mixture of the Bernoulli distribution with parameter p and the uniform distribution on [0, 1], with weights 1 2 and 1 2 . It is easy to see that for p, q ∈ (0, 1), the Kullback-Leibler divergence between SBer(p) and SBer(q) is given by KL(SBer(p), SBer(q)) = 1 2 KL(Ber(p), Ber(q)) = 1 2 p log p q + (1 − p) log 1 − p 1 − q .
In particular, a second-order Taylor expansion yields that: for all η ∈ (0, With (9) in hand, the following lemma becomes a direct consequence of Lemma 1 and Remark 5 in Kaufmann et al. [2016] .
Lemma 28. Let k ≥ 2, η ∈ (0, 
D.2 CBAI Lower Bound
In this subsection, we show how to prove the lower bounds for CBAI using the technique sketched in Subsection 4.3. In particular, we will show how to prove Theorem 16 by "CBAI-lifting" the MAB instances we proved were hard in Lemma 28. The proof of Corollary 17 then follows immediately by letting α → 0; or said differently, by realizing that an algorithm that returns the best arm with probability at least 1 − δ, is by definition a (0, δ)-PAC algorithm.
Proof of Theorem 16. Fix any k ≥ 2, δ ∈ (0, Lifting for oblivious and prescient adversaries. Define the following distributions: In other words, samples generated from SBer(p i ) are equal in distribution to samples generated from the above contaminated mixture model of (1 − ε)F i and ε times a Dirac measure.
Next, a simple calculation shows that m 1 (F 1 ) = p 1 , m 1 (F 1 ) = p 1 + ε, m 2 (F 1 ) = 1−ε 2 . And similarly for any i ∈ {2, . . . , k}, we have m 1 (F i ) = p i , m 1 (F i ) = p i − ε, m 2 (F i ) = 1−ε 2 . Moreover, for all i ∈ [k], we have that F i ∈ F B,t for B = 4 and anyt < . Therefore we conclude that for each i ∈ [k], the change in median between the distribution F i and the contaminated distributionF i is equal to |m 1 (F i ) − m 1 (F i )| = ε = Bm 2 (F i ) ε 2(1 − ε) = U ε,B,m 2 (F i ) .
Therefore we conclude that running any (α, δ)-approximate CBAI algorithm A on the samples obtained from the above BAI instance will result in A outputting armÎ satisfying m 1 (F i ) ≥ m 1 (F 1 ) − (2U ε,B, 1−ε 2 + α), with probability at least 1 − δ. Whenever this occurs, we have by the above calculations that pî ≥ p 1 −α. Therefore A returned an α approximate arm with probability at least 1 − δ, for this hard BAI instance. We conclude from the lower bound in (10) that A must use at least Ω Lifting for malicious adversaries. The idea is similar to what we did above for the oblivious and prescient cases. The difference is that malicious adversaries can shift quantiles further (see Corollary 13) and as such we must exhibit a lifting that exactly matches this larger shift. Formally, define the following underlying distributions over the CBAI arms: In other words, samples generated from SBer(p i ) are equal in distribution to the samples generated by the malicious CBAI adversary's distribution C i .
Next, a simple calculation shows that for the optimal arm, (F 1 ) −1 ( which is exactly equal to the largest possible uncertainty. Therefore we conclude by an identical reduction argument as in the oblivious/prescient adversary proof above.
